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ABSTRACT 
 
Communities choose their identities over time with distinct objectives in mind. 
Nepamul Sikkimese (Sikkimese of Nepali origin) had to struggle at various 
periods in the last 150 years for their citizenship, political rights and recognition 
of Nepali language as an Indian language. The year 1990 turned out to be critical 
for them. The democratic movement in Nepal let loose a movement of ‘janajati’, 
an under-current that spread in Sikkim as well. The movement received a 
momentum after the government of India accepted the recommendations of the 
Backward Class Commission that had termed most of the Sikkimese Nepamul as 
Other Backward Classes. When pressed for the implementation of the above 
decision of the government of India in Sikkim, the former Chief Minister of the 
state ruled out such a possibility, and lost the support of the majority in the State 
Assembly. Within the next few weeks his successor government promptly 
extended the ‘OBC’ status to as many as eight Nepamul communities and 
provided them with all the contingent constitutional facilities. Some years after 
that event, two OBCs, Limbus and Tamangs, were declared as ‘Scheduled 
Tribes”. This has resulted in a mad rush among the rest of the ‘OBCs’ to clamour 
for ‘Scheduled Tribe’ status and as many as eight of them approached the State 
Government with their ‘ethnographic reports’. These reports identify existence of 
myths, clothing, food habits, languages, architect, arts and crafts and other 
cultural traits painting each of them as distinct communities, disclaiming a 
common cultural tradition of Nepamul. The State is encouraging this trend with a 
distinct goal in view. This process of tribalization of the communities from within 
the Nepamul fold has serious conceptual and sociological implications, which we 
propose to uncover in the present paper. 
 
 
Introduction 
Will the multi-ethnic societies such as `Nepali’ necessarily emerge 
more cohesive, uniform and modern? One would like to celebrate 
Harka Gurung’s (1997) optimism about multi-ethnic societies of 
Sikkim and Darjeeling, but recent events in Sikkim do not 
encourage one to do so. One must hasten that Gurung is in good 
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company of Michael Hutt, who approvingly quotes Lhotshampa 
technocrat Bhim Subba: “We have Rais, Magars, Tamangs, 
Chhetris, Bahuns, Kamis, Damais, Sarkis - all in one village. And 
we do not have a system of segregation, or on the other hand, 
suppression by supposed higher castes” (Hutt, 2003: 99). The 
present author found similar situation in Sikkim as well. The 
Sikkimese Nepamul appear to have bothered little about their social 
composition as long as they were struggling against the feudal 
oppression. As soon as they realized that economically they were 
relatively secured in a democratic set-up, which they controlled as 
per law of the land, they addressed themselves to larger issues such 
as citizenship, recognition of Nepali language and political 
representation in the state. Once the resolution to the above issues 
was within the reach, attention began to shift to the fate of the 
individual ethnic groups. It was realized that the time was ripe for 
advocating distinctive ethnic markers within the Nepamul social 
commonwealth and there came the ancient Kirat identity handy. 
This process is still on and indications are there for any body to see 
that multi-ethnic Sikkimese Nepamul society is passing through a 
serious phase of transition. So much so that some members of 
higher castes formed a ‘Chhetri-Bahun-Newar Association’ in 1995 
to safeguard their interests. These three relatively developed castes 
were also subsequently accorded the status of OBC in Sikkim. In 
this paper, we have tried to map out the travails of the Sikkimese 
Nepamul since their arrival in Sikkim through the phase of social 
reforms, the anti-feudal movement, the merger of Sikkim with 
India, and at the end, highlight the on-going process of a larger 
Kirat identity formation. Many of our comments are tentative, as 
evidence is limited.  
 
Construction of the `Paharia’ Image 
Limbus, an inseparable part of Kirat identity, are counted among 
the earliest settlers of Sikkim. Even the term ‘Sikkim’ is of Limbu 
origin. It is claimed that a newly wedded Limbu lady, when 
welcomed by the groom’s party in a newly constructed house, 
exclaimed: Sukhim (new house). Limbu and Magar have old roots 
in Sikkim. Limbus were appropriated by the Namgyal rulers within 
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Lamaist scheme of things in the form of ‘Lhomentsongsum’ a 
‘commonwealth of Bhotias, Lepchas and Tsongs’ (Sinha, 1975). 
Magars along with Limbus figured in the history of Sikkim as 
victims of Bhotia court intrigues in which they were forced to 
emigrate to Nepal. However, the remnants of their settlements can 
be identified in the form of ‘Magarkots’ or ‘Magardzongs’ in West 
District (Sinha, 2005). J W Edgar has reported them to be 
cultivating cardamom and oilseeds at Daramden in West District in 
his visit to Pemayangtse in 1874 (Edgar, 1969:74). Some years 
earlier, in 1867, two Newar brothers, Laxmidas and Chandrabir 
Maskey, were invited by  a section of the Namgyal courtiers from 
Darjeeling to mine copper ore and mint coins for the state at an 
annual fee of Rs. 1200. Though their mining and minting enterprise 
did not last for more than a decade, they were responsible for 
bringing in Magar labourers for mining, introducing forest 
conservation, building of roads and bridges in the East District and 
establishing the lessee system of land tenure in Sikkim.  
 
John C White, who was appointed in Gangtok as the 
Political Officer in 1889, found Sikkimese scenario in bleak and 
pathetic condition: “Chaos reigned everywhere, there was no 
revenue system, the Maharaja taking what he required as he wanted 
from the people…no court of justice, no police, no public works, no 
education for the younger generation. The task before me was a 
difficult one, but very fascinating; the country was new one and 
every thing was in my hands”. Furthermore, he noted that: “The 
coffers were empty, and the first thing to be done was to devise 
some means by which we could raise a revenue… a basis for 
taxation and revenue was established. At the same time the forests 
were placed under control, excise was introduced, and by these 
means in about ten years the revenue was raised from Rs. 8,000 to 
Rs. 2,200,000. But the country was sparsely populated, and in order 
to bring more land under cultivation, it was necessary to encourage 
immigration, and this was done by giving land on favourable terms 
to Nepalese, who, as soon as they knew it was to be had, came in. 
Earlier in my service I had spent over a year in Nepal on special 
duty and had learnt some thing of the people and their ways, which 
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proved now to be useful in dealing with them” (White, 1971: 26-
27). In his memorial book on his exploits in and around Sikkim, 
White used the word ‘Paharias’ to refer to the Sikkimese Nepamul. 
 
By then the British had invented the ‘warrior gentlemen 
Gurkhas’ (Caplan, 1995) as a solid custodian of the frontier 
defence. This was also the phase in the British perception, when a 
positive twist was given to what is known as ‘forward policy to the 
Himalayas’, in which Tibetans were one of the prime targets. 
Herbert Risley wrote on the utilitarian aspect of the Nepalese factor 
in the defence scheme of the Eastern Himalayan frontiers: “Most of 
all our position be strengthened by the change which is insensibly 
but steadily taking place in the composition of the population of 
Sikkim. The Lepchas as has been stated, are rapidly dying out; 
while from the west, the industrious Newars and the Goorkhas of 
Nepal are pressing forward to clear and cultivate large areas of 
unoccupied land on which European tea planters of Darjeeling have 
already cast longing eyes. The influx of these hereditary enemies of 
Tibet is our surest guaranty against a revival of Tibetan influence. 
Here also religion will play a leading part. In Sikkim, as in India, 
Hinduism will assuredly cast out Budhhism and the praying wheel 
of the lama will give place to the sacrificial implements of the 
Brahman. The land will follow the creed; the Tibetan proprietors 
will be gradually dispossessed, and will take themselves to the petty 
trade for which they have an undeniable aptitude. Thus, race and 
religion, the prime movers of the Asiatic world, will settle the 
Sikkim difficulty for us, in their own way. We have only to look on 
and see the operation of these causes is not artificially hindered by 
the interference of Tibet or Nepal” (Risley, 1972). 
 
This was the heritage left behind by the British in terms of 
putting one community against against another. Half a dozen British 
Political Officers between 1908 and 1947 maintained the same 
façade. The king was happy with his religious paintings and the 
‘almighty’ Political Officer ruled the principality as he liked. The 
democratic movement against the British colonial rule in India 
disturbed the placid Sikkimese situation and the nervous king sent a 
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delegation consisting of his son and private secretary to represent 
his case before the ‘Cabinet Mission’ in New Delhi in May 1946. 
The Sikkim delegation failed to meet the Cabinet Mission and they 
were advised to return to Gangtok and wait for the decision. And 
for that the Political & Foreign Department, Government of India 
sent a ‘Note’ to the Political Officer in Gangtok on August 10, 
1946, which states: “In practice, it may well prove difficult to 
secure a tidy solution of the future of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan and 
even the eastern marches of Kashmir. This will largely depend on 
the future policy and fate of China and hence of Tibet. The 
Government of the (Indian) Union must be prepared for 
complications on North East Frontier and evolve a policy to meet 
them. This may well have to be that of maintaining all the 
principalities in virtual independence of India, but as buffer, as far 
as possible, (as) client states. There may be greater advantages in 
according Sikkim a more independent status than in seeking to 
absorb Bhutan as well as Sikkim in the Indian Union, adding the 
communal problem of Buddhism to those of Islam and 
Hinduism…The Government will be well advised to avoid entering 
into fresh commitments with any one of those frontier states or 
seeking to redefine their status. Their importance is strategic in 
direct relation to Tibet and China and indirectly to Russia. Such 
adjustment of relations with the (Indian) Union can fully be affected 
by those political and strategic considerations … account of which, 
it is hoped the treaty will take, rather than by constitutional niceties, 
which do not help defence policy” (see Sinha, 1998).   
 
By the second decade of the twentieth century, the entire 
cultivable hill slopes of southern and western Sikkim were 
apportioned into revenue elakas (blocks), which were to be leased 
on fixed revenue returns. The land lease was granted first in 1915 
and last in 1935. There were 104 revenue blocks, of which the 
Nepamul Sikkimese held 13 of them. A number of them went for 
western education invariably to the Christian mission-run 
institutions in adjoining district of Darjeeling and occupied salaried 
positions in various departments of the government. By the year 
1891, Nepamul population had already reached more than 50 
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percent  and when the British left India in 1947, more than 2/3
rd
 
population of the Himalayan principality belonged to them, a 
process that could not be reversed even by a die-hard Palden 
Thondup Namgyal, the last ruler of Sikkim. Sikkim also had the 
institution of Kazi aristocracy, but they did not have much to show 
in terms of either social status or material wealth in comparison to 
their Nepalese counterpart, the Ranas. 
 
By the middle of the 20
th
 century, a situation emerged in 
Sikkim in which broadly speaking two ethnic blocks emerged. One 
such block comprised the Bhotias, Lepchas and  Limbus and the 
other block consisted of about a dozen and half communities 
belonging to the Sikkimese Nepamul. With the exception of 
Lepcha, Limbu and Bhotia, all other ethnic groups of Sikkim had 
forgotten their mother tongues, if they ever spoke them, and Nepali 
developed as their mother tongue, besides being the lingua franca 
of the principality. While most ethnic groups solicited the services 
of their sacred specialists during rite de passage, they often invited 
Brahmin priests for marriage and death rituals. Ethnic barriers in 
terms of social intercourse had largely disappeared, as most of the 
communities were numerically so small that individual caste/ethnic 
boundaries were not feasible to maintain. By tradition, land 
belonged either to Bhotia, Lepcha, Limbu or Newar, and most of 
the Nepamul in Sikkim were service castes such as Bahun, Chhetri, 
Damai, Kami, Sarki or were marginal farmers. 
 
Building New Ethnic Blocks: Bhotia-Lepcha versus Nepamul 
Soon after the British withdrawal from India, Sikkim State 
Congress was organized on December 7, 1947 to petition to the 
ruler on its three point demands:(i) abolition of the land lease 
holdings; (ii) formation of a popular government, and (iii) merger 
with India. Egged up by its fraternal support from elsewhere, the 
Congress launched an agitation in support of its charter of demands. 
The crown prince got a group of Bhotia landlords and his courtiers 
to establish the Sikkim National Party on April 30, 1948 as ‘an anti-
thesis of Sikkim State Congress’ with a view to protecting special 
privileges of the feudal elements and Bhotia dominance in the 
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affairs of the state. The State Congress with its popular demands 
went on agitation for over a year. Thousands of Congress suporters 
cordoned off the palace on May1, 1949 and demanded formation of 
a popular government. The king was forced to form a five member 
popular government with Tashi Tshering, the President of the State 
Congress, on May 9, 1949 without spelling out limits of authority 
and rules of operation. The expectations of the masses from this 
new government were very high but the crown prince was 
determined to sabotage this first experiment of democracy in 
Sikkim. The Congress leaders themselves did not help much in the 
matter. Once it was realized that differences between the two sides 
could not be resolved and the administration was at standstill, the 
Political Officer dismissed the government in the name of the 
Government of India and took over the administration. Very soon, 
New Delhi sent a senior bureaucrat as the Dewan to head the 
adminstration on its behalf. 
 
The Government of India became a party to the democratic 
fraud through its Dewan, when the ruler issued the State Council 
and Executive Council Proclamation, 1953 with a view “to 
associating people more and more closely with the governance of 
the state”. The Proclamation stipulated an intricate arrangement of 
electoral process with a limited, complex, controversial and 
purposive political representation, which came to be known as the 
“Parity System”. First of all, it created an artificial parity between 
two ethnic groups, Lepcha-Bhutias on one side and the Nepamul on 
the other, turning the entire politico-administrative structure 
communal. Secondly, a deliberately complicated voting and 
counting procedure was introduced, which could be manipulated in 
favour or against somebody, if and when required. Thirdly, the ruler 
and his adminstration did try to display that State Congress 
represented ‘Nepalese’ only and his own creation, National Party, 
represented Lepcha- Bhutias combine. The first general election for 
the State Council was held in 1953 for an 18-member house in 
which six seats were reserved for Lepcha-Bhutias, six for the 
Nepalese and  another six were nominated by the ruler. Needless to 
say that the administration saw to it that Nepalese were elected on 
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seat meant for the community only as the candidates of the State 
Congress and Lepcha-Bhutias did the same as the candidates of the 
National Party.   
 
The above situation continued for the next two decades. By 
the end of 1960s the last ruler of Namgyal dynasty, Palden Thondup 
Namgyal, began to nurse an ambition of membership to the  United 
Nations Organization (UNO) for Sikkim and this made him 
desperate to identify more and more with the vanishing Bhutia 
practices as the Sikkimese practices. This design was not 
appreciated by bulk of the Sikkimese masses, who were 
discriminated by the ruler in favour of the arrogant Bhutia 
aristocracy and buraucracy. The situation was so explosive that a 
small controversy with reference to counting of the votes at 
Gangtok after 1973 election was good enough to ignite frayed 
patience of the political activists for cancellation of the election and 
launching a movement for political reforms. The ruler ignored the 
demands and went ahead with the preparation of his golden jubilee 
celebration as the national day on April 4, 1973. Within no time the 
agitation spread to the interrior and agitators established people’s 
regime at places after chasing away the state functionaries from 
their posts. The newly formed political outfit, Sikkim Janata 
Congress, spear-heading the agitation, articulated the popular 
aspirations by demanding: full-fledged democracy, a written 
Constitution, fundamental rights, one man one vote principle based 
on adult franchise, and abolition of the notorious ‘parity system’. 
The agitation turned violent and the ruler lost all his control on the 
state. In the cicumstances, for the second time after 1949, the ruler 
of Sikkim had to request the Government of India to take over the 
administration of the state. 
 
The next two years were a period of uncertainty, turmoil, 
demonstration for and against the regime, dramatic decline in 
ruler’s support base and demise of his domesticated political 
factotem, Sikkim National Party, in the body politics of Sikkim. It 
also marked the emergence of Kazi Lhendup Dorji as the most 
significant political player in the state with Nar Bahadur Khatiwada, 
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Ram Chandra Poudyal and Krishna Chandra Pradhan as his trouble 
shooters. In the confused and uncertain environment, ‘there were 
charges that Indian armed forces were instrumental in support of 
agitators, while poor Maharaja was reported to store arms and 
ammunitions for a posssible resistance (Dutta Ray, 1983). What 
resulted in was a very fast change of the events: ruler’s refusal to 
compromise with the agitating politicians, invalidation of 1973 
election, fresh election to the State Council in 1974, demand for 
associating Sikkim with India, ruler’s visit to Kathmandu against 
the advice of the government of India, State Council’s resolution to 
abolish the office of the Chogyal, referendum to decide Sikkim’s 
future and its merger with India in May 1975. As an interim 
arrangement, the existing State Council was treated as the State 
Assembly for a period of five years from its election in 1974. 
 
Once the Tripartite Agreement was signed between the 
ruler, the representative of the government of India and leaders of 
the political parties in Sikkim, a 32-member State Council was 
envisaged in which there would be 15 seats each for Lepcha-
Bhutias and Nepamul of Sikkim, one seat for the Scheduled Castes 
and one seat for the Buddhist monasteries. The 1974 election was 
fought on that basis and once the state was merged with India in 
1975, the State Council was deemed to be the State Legislative 
Assembly for a term of five years from its inception in 1974. It is 
equally important to recall what the Government of Sikkim Act, 
1974, Clause 7, Section II stipulated: “The Government of Sikkim 
may make rules for the purpose of providing that the Assembly 
adequately represents the various sections of the population, that is 
to say while fully protecting the legitimate rights and interests of 
Sikkimese of Lepcha or Bhutia origin and Sikkimese of Nepali 
origin and other Sikkimese, including Tsongs, Scheduled Castes, no 
single section of population is allowed to acquire a dominating 
position in the affairs of Sikkim mainly by its ethnic origin”.  
  
We have mentioned above that the Nepamul Sikkimese have 
been demanding restoration of reserved seats to them in the State 
Assembly since 1979, the year it was undone. But it has not been 
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done and there appears to be little chance of its being restored in the 
near future. Meanwhile, Sikkim has joined the North Eastern 
Council (NEC) for the purpose development administration. There 
are a number of states within NEC, which are known as “tribal 
states” because they have more than half of their population 
recognized by the Union Government as Scheduled Tribes. Taking 
a cue from the above practice, the government of Sikkim decided to 
approach the Union Government to accord the status of Scheduled 
Tribe to the communities listed in the State as the MBCs or Most 
Backward Communities. There are already 38 percent population of 
Sikkim recognized as Scheduled Tribes and another 5.93 percent of 
them as Scheduled Castes. The present ruling party - Sikkim 
Democratic Front (SDF) - is committed to bring all the Nepamul 
Sikkimese under special constitutional categories like Scheduled 
Castes, Scheduled Tribes, OBCs and MBCs. They do not hide their 
efforts and their desire to see that the communities listed among the 
MBCs in the state are accorded the status of the Scheduled Tribes. 
Once it is achieved, apart from the social engineering of uplifting 
the ‘educationally and economically backward communities’, 
another 22.4 percent population will be added to the total, staking a 
genuine claim of being a tribal state, which will have its own 
advantages in terms of liberal allotment of the fund. 
 
In this way the demographically dominant Nepamul 
Sikkimese ethnic commonwealth spent four decades between 1953 
and 1994 towards consolidation of their ‘Nepali’ identity vis-a-vis 
the Lepcha-Bhutia combine in the politics of Sikkim. However, 
several intellectuals among them, specially among the Kiratas, 
began to realize that their continued emphasis on ‘Nepali’ identity 
had led to further consolidation of Bahun-Chhetri-Newar 
dominance, more sanskritization of their rituals and customs along 
the classical Hindu practices and further marginalization of their 
languages and cultures in favour of the Indo-Aryan Nepali language 
and culture. This realization came rather late, but it did. Although 
the process of “looking back” seemed irreversible the same swept 
both Nepal and Nepali diaspora in India since early 1990s, which 
further strengthened their resolve to regain their subjugated 
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identities and use them for new economic and political 
opportunities (Sinha, 2005: 23). 
 
T. B. Subba conducted fieldwork on three locations in 
Eastern Nepal in 1992-93 and tried to see the issue of Kirata 
identity in much deeper and extensive way across Nepal, Darjeeling 
and Sikkim (Subba, 1999). In case of Sikkim, Limbus have already 
won their battle for recognition as a Scheduled Tribe and now they 
appear to be more concerned with their ‘reserved’ representation in 
the State Assembly than fighting a common battle for the Kirat 
cause. In fact, there appears a race for getting recognition of 
individual community as a ‘Scheduled Tribe’ than that of a 
concerted move for Kirat entity. However, Subba’s observations 
have profound bearing on Kirat identity. On the basis of three 
socio-economic parametres - education, occupation and landholding 
- he found no significant differences between Kirats and other 
Nepali groups like Tagadharis (referring to Nepali high castes), 
other Mongoloid communities and the so-called `Untouchables’. He 
even writes, ‘the objective differences in culture between the 
Tagadhari and Kirata categories have been bridged to a large extent 
in the last couple of centuries’ (p 71).  
 
Emergence of Nar Bahadur Bhandari and Consolidation of 
Nepamul Sikkimese 
About a month before conducting the first general election to the 
State Assembly, the government of India issued Ordinance No. 7, 
1979 by which the notorious ‘parity system’ was abolished; 12 seats 
were reserved for Lepcha and Bhutia; one seat was allotted to the 
Sangha (the monk body); two seats were ascribed to the Scheduled 
Castes and the remaining 17 seats in the Assembly of 32 were 
declared “General’, which meant that any bona fide Indian voter 
was entitled to contest on those seats. These stipulations stirred the 
Nepamul Sikkimese a great deal, as they had not anticipated this 
when they fought for democracy. They had presumed that once the 
‘parity system’ was abolished, all the unreserved seats in the State 
Assembly would automatically be allotted to them. Nepamul leaders 
like R C Poudyal and B B Gurung termed it ‘black ordinance’ and 
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decided to callenge it in the court of law. They also accused the 
Kazi for being hand in glove with the Central Government to deny 
the majority Nepamul their natural rights and active, dynamic and 
popular Nepamul leaders parted company with the Kazi before the 
first election to State Assembly in October 1979. 
 
Kazi, although born and brought up in feudal and theocratic 
fold, was quick to change. This most active politician in Sikkim for 
over three decdes and the only effective face of democratic 
opposition to the ruler was after all a state level leader, who was not 
cut for hurley-burley of the Indian national political scene. Thus, he 
kept on changing his political affiliation as per change of power in 
New Delhi ignoring the organizational base of his political party 
and willy-nilly created an impression among the Sikkimese at large 
that it were the bureaucrats on deputation sent by New Delhi who 
were running the show in his name. While effective mass Nepamul 
leaders had switched off their loyalty to him, the feudal elements 
were looking for a viable set-up to teach him a lesson or two. They 
discovered Nar Bahadur Bhandari, a former school teacher, who 
had opposed the merger of Sikkim to India for which he was 
allegedlly tortured and jailed. Bhandari had formed his own 
political party,  Sikkim Janata Parishad, with a marked anti-merger 
and pro-Chogyal stance. He could dare to term the 32 members of 
the disolved State Assembly as ‘Thirty-two Thieves, who had sold 
the Country’ (‘battise chor’ and ‘des bechwa’) from public platform 
and there was no body to oppose him. The results of the general 
election were a forgone conclusion; every body knew that Kazi and 
Co. were going to lose the election. They lost so badly that his 
party’s future was sealed for all the time to come. Bhandari 
managed to form the government in the state and remained in power 
for the next 15 years. It is ironic that the Kazi, a former monk of 
mixed Lepcha-Bhutia parentage, who was accepted by the Nepamul 
Sikkimese to dethrone 333 years of Namgyal rule was to have such 
an exit.  
 
Bhandari had raised three demands all through 1980s and 
turned out to be the spokesman of the Nepamul grievances: (1) 
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Restoration of Assembly seats for Nepamul Sikkimese; (2) Granting 
of citizenship to the stateless Nepamul residing in Sikkim for long; 
and (3) Recognition of Nepali language and its inclusion in the VIII 
Schedule of the Indian Constitution. He could largely succeed in 
getting his last two demands fulfilled, but getting the ‘General’ 
seats reserved for the Nepamul could not be clinched. It appears that 
now the community is reconciled to status quo and demands are 
made now to increase the seats in the State Assembly to partly 
answer the above grievance. Bhandari ruled the State ruthlessly and 
any form of dissent was not tolerated. It was he who established the 
political tradition according to which the winner takes every thing 
either by getting the candidates elected or causing defection from 
the opposition to one’s fold. His consecutive success for the second 
and third terms to the office of the Chief Minister went to his head 
and he began to treat Sikkim as his pocket bureau (Kazi, 1994). 
However, it goes without saying that Bhandari did consoldate the 
Nepamul Sikkimese as a sub set in the social commonwealth of 
Indian Union. 
 
From Nepamul to OBC Identity 
The caste structure of the Nepali society is based on the same 
pattern of purity and pollution as the rest of Indian society is. But 
the caste-based disabilities are not as severe as in some parts of 
India. A three-tier categorisation of Nepali castes known as 
‘Tagadhari’ (the twice-born), ‘Matwali’ (those who take alcoholic 
drinks), and `Untochables’ exists among them. The Matwalis were 
again divided into enslaveable and unenslaveable as per the Muluki 
Ain promulgated by Rana Jung Bahadur in 1853. All through the 
Rana period in the history of Nepal, the social scene in Nepal was 
governed by the same civil code. On occasions, the Nepamul in 
Sikkim and Bhutan were treated in the light of the Nepalese code of 
law. Inspite of the democratic innovations in 1950s, the Muluki Ain 
continued in practice till it was abrogated in 1963 by King 
Mahendra, but ethnic situation remained frozen on the pattern of 
past practices.  
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Things began to change in Nepal in 1980s, when Magurali 
(a federation of Magar, Gurung, Rai and Limbu) was formed. The 
country was declared as a multi-ethnic and multi-lingual state. 
Nepal Janajati Mahasangh (Nepal Federation of the Nationalities—
NEFEN) was launched with a view to bring in all ethnic groups 
under one umbrella. To begin with NEFEN was founded as a 
federation of seven different organizations: by 1993 it had 21 
federating units representing 21 ethnic groups. It maintains an anti-
Bahun (hill Brahmin) attitude in its dealings and its members are 
supposed to be anti-Hindu. Thus when the associations of Chhetris 
and Dalits tried to seek membership of NEFEN, they were asked to 
shun Hindu practices before they could be welcomed to the ‘club’ 
and naturally their request was turned down (Gellner, 1997: 22). 
Thus, there is a trend among the ethnic groups of Nepal at large to 
distance them from the Hindu caste system, Brahminical practices 
and what came to be termed as the Hindu great traditions. The 
ethnic groups are now engaged in emphasizing their distinctive 
identity markers.  
 
Coming to the Sikkimese situation, the Government of India 
had issued the Scheduled Tribe and Scheduled Caste Order 
notifying Bhutias and Lepchas as Scheduled Tribes and Damai, 
Kami, Majhi and Sarki as Scheduled Castes on June 26, 1978. The 
Bill No. 9 (for rearranging seats in the State Legislative Assembly 
in Sikkim) was introduced in the Lok Sabha on May 18, 1979, 
which became an Act in 1981 during the Prime Ministership of late 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi.  
 
It is very pertinent to remember that elsewhere in India seats 
in the legislative bodies have been reserved for the Scheduled 
Tribes of the particular state, but in case of Sikkim an exception has 
been made by mentioning Lepcha-Bhutias by name. Similarly, 
considering the unique role played by the Buddhist monks and 
monasteries in the body politics of Sikkim in the past, secular India 
made a special provision to allot a seat to them in the State 
Legislative Assembly of Sikkim. 
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Nar Bahadur Bhandari’s third term as the Chief Minister of 
Sikkim from 1989 onwards marked the gradual integration of 
Sikkim with Indian political system. The Union Government of 
India had decided to implement the recommendation of the 
Backward Class Commission Report by reserving 27 percent seats 
in educational, welfare, political and administrative offices to the 
communities listed by the Commission. Incidentally, the 
Commission had listed all the communities in Sikkim as 
economically and educationally backward. Naturally, Sikkim could 
not remain untouched from this development. Bhandari, hailing 
from the Chhetri caste, instead of responding positively to the 
demand of the Other Backward Classes (OBCs), was busy 
spearheading a demand for the recognition of the Nepali language 
as one of the Indian national languages. One of his long time 
associates, Pawan Kumar Chamling, and also a cabinet minister in 
Bhandari regime, raised the issue of implementing the 
recommendations of the Mandal Commission Report in Sikkim in 
1992 and for that he was expelled from the Sikkim Sangram 
Parishad Legislative Party. However, a turning point came in 1994, 
when the state assembly passed a resolution against the 
implementation of the Mandal Commission Report. Within no time 
19 out of 31 members of Bhandari’s legislative party deserted him 
to form a parallel political forum, Sikkim Sangram Parishad 
(Sanchman). Bhandari was voted out of the office of the Chief 
Minister on May 19, 1994. The successor government immediately 
recommended to the Union Government to include seven 
communities from among the “Sikkimese of Nepali origin” as 
“socially and educationally backward Classes (OBCs)”. 
Consequently, Bhujel, Gurung, Limbu, Magar, Rai, Sunuwar and 
Tamang were declared OBC in Sikkim on June 2, 1994.  
 
The fourth general election for the state assembly in Sikkim 
was held on November 16, 1994 and Pawan Kumar Chamling 
fought it on the slogan of “Bhasha Na Bhat” (language or food?) 
against Bhandari’s credit for getting Nepali recognized as a national 
language of India. Electorate rejected language in favour of food 
and Chamling formed the government with 19 members in the 
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house of 32. By the time the fifth general election was declared in 
1999, Chamling had consolidated his position by according 
recognition to ten languages (Nepali, Lepcha, Bhutia, Limbu, 
Magar, Rai, Gurung, Sherpa, Newar and Tamang) as the official 
languages of the state in 1995, promised to include all Nepalis in 
the list of OBCs in 1996, and opposed merger of Sikkim with that 
of Darjeeling in 1997. His strength in the state assembly after the 
fifth general election rose to 24. By the time the sixth general 
election was announced in 2004, Chamling’s SDF had literally 
replaced Bhandari’s SSP. By then Bhandari was the lone member 
occupying the opposition benches in the state assembly, as other six 
members elected on his party tickets had joined Chamling’s fold. In 
such a situation, the result of the next election was almost certain. 
By getting all his 32 candidates elected to state assembly in 2004 
Chamling repeated Bhandari’s 1989 feat. One of the longest serving 
chief ministers in India, Bhandari found himself outside the state 
assembly for the first time in 25 years. 
 
Search for Kirat Identity  
The belated step to label the Limbus as one of the OBCs did not 
satisfy their expectations. In fact, the community was nursing a 
grievance against the democratic dispensation, which had lumped 
them along with the rest of the Nepamul for political representation. 
They even fondly remembered that they were allotted a seat in the 
State Council in 1967, which was done away with in 1974. Thus, 
they continued to press for recognition of their status as a Scheduled 
Tribe, as they were one of the original inhabitants of Sikkim along 
with Lepchas and Bhutias. At last, in December 2002, Limbus and 
Tamangs were accorded the status of the Scheduled Tribes in 
Sikkim and West Bengal. Furthermore, in partial modification of 
earlier orders of the State through the Notification No.2/WD of June 
2, 1994 and Notification No. 236/SW/251(3) WD dated June 15, 
2000, the Government of Sikkim declared (i) Bhujel, (ii) Dewan, 
(iii) Gurung, (iv) Jogi, (v) Kirat Rai, (vi) Magar, (vii) Sunuwar, and 
(viii) Thami  as the “Most Backward Classes”  (MBC). Similarly, 
(i) Bahun, (ii) Chhetri, (iii) Newar, and (iv) Sanyasi were given the 
status of “Other Backward Classes” (OBC) in Sikkim (vide Sikkim 
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Government Gazette: Extraordinary, No. 308, dated Gangtok, 
Friday 19
th
 September, 2003). In this context, the readers may be 
reminded of a news item in the Gangtok Times, informing 
formation of a ‘Bahun-Chhetri-Newar Association with avowed 
objective of “protecting unity of the Sikkimese People” on the plea 
that though some of them were considered ‘forward’, most of the 
members of these castes were poor and ‘have-nots’ (April 29-May 4 
Issue, 1995). Through these notifications Chamling fulfilled the 
promises made in 1996 to the State to bring every Nepamul 
community under OBC quota. 
 
It may be noted that the State Assembly has 12 seats 
reserved for the Lepcha-Bhutia communities, and not for the 
Scheduled Tribes as elsewhere in India. This provision was 
challenged in the court of law. The highest court in India upheld the 
provision as a part of the “Tripartite Agreement” signed in 1973 
between the then ruler, representative of the Union Government and 
representatives of the political parties in Sikkim. Now, Limbu and 
Tamang, who have been recognized as Scheduled Tribes, are 
naturally demanding political representation in State Assembly. 
Apparently, 12 seats reserved for the Lepcha-Bhutias by name 
cannot be tempered with and there is no seat set aside for the 
Scheduled Tribes in the Assembly. The Government of Sikkim has 
come out with various suggestions to solve the problem. This has 
not deterred many other communities from the Most Backward 
Classes from staking a claim to be Scheduled Tribes. As many as 
eight ethnic groups (Bhujel, Dewan, Gurung, Jogi, Magar, Rai, 
Sunuwar and Thami) impressed upon the Government of Sikkim to 
accord them the status of Scheduled Tribe. The Government of 
Sikkim saw merit in their claims and approached the Union 
Government to accord its approval, but they were advised to re-
apply for consideration along with an ‘ethnographic report on the 
claims of the various communities’. The Government of Sikkim did 
that and is waiting for the decision of the Union Government. 
 
Prior to approaching the Union Government, the 
Government of Sikkim asked their concerned officials to request the 
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concerned communities to prepare their respective ethnographic 
reports. In terms of size, some of them are in thousands. For 
example, Rais are as many as 72,418 individuals as per the last 
census conducted in 2001. Gurungs (37,105) and Magar (10, 858) 
are other two numerically important communities. However, there 
are as many as five communities between 3326 (Bhujel) and 223 
(Thami). Six of the communities (Bhujel, Yakkha, Gurung, Kirant 
Rai, Magar and Sunuwar) presented their respective reports for 
consideration of the committee appointed for the purpose. It is 
interesting to learn that even the officers of the Department of 
Social Welfare failed to locate any social or welfare organization 
among two of the numerically smallest communities (Jogi and 
Thami) and thus, there was no ‘ethnographic report’ presented to 
the committee on their behalf. There was such a report on behalf of 
Dewans, but no community with this nomenclature is known to 
exist in Indian census operation.  
 
Three of the communities claiming ST status in Sikkim - 
Magar, Sunuwar and Rai - published their ethnographic reports 
recently. It is apparent that the respective associations of the various 
communities went out of their way to showcase their unique 
customs, dress, food habits, arts, crafts, architecture, vocations, 
implements, ornaments, marital pattern, etc. In the words of a 
sociologist of culture, Bennett M Berger, they “want to assert, 
argue, persuade that such symbols/meanings like baskets, pots, and 
watches, are about getting us through the days and nights we are 
more or less stuck with, and in doing so providing us with a sense 
of having got through with some dignity. Dignity itself, of course, is 
a precious piece of culture…that to see the matter this way is not to 
demean (de-mean) the dignity; it is only to look it hard in the face, 
and ask it tough questions” ( Berger, 1995: 8-9). 
 
Reading their ethnographic reports one gets the impression 
that all these communities were Buddhists or Animists who were 
forced by Hindu kings and Brahmin priests to follow Sanskritic 
traditions and Brahminical rituals. All of them, with the exception 
of Jogi, claim to speak distinct languages of their own. But it was 
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found that all of them speak Nepali among themselves. The State 
also has recognized their languages as official languages and has 
even appointed some language teachers in some schools but there 
are no pupils around in some of the schools willing to be taught 
their own languages. Their rites de passage exhibit a lot of 
commonality with those of other caste Hindus. Many of the 
communities have their own sacred specialists, but they often invite 
Brahmin priests on various occasions. Most of these communities 
are today suffering from lack of national symbols which would 
represent them and simultaneously differentiate them from the 
Tagadharis and Untouchables whose cultures are very similar to 
each other. The question of difference with Other Mongoloids is 
perhaps the most vexing one for various reasons. It is important for 
the Kirats to construct powerful symbol of differences with the 
Tagadharis for it is mainly the latter that they hold responsible for 
their present state of affairs (in Nepal). It is again the latter against 
whom they appear to be fighting. But this fight is uneasy: the 
symbol of difference between them are not so powerful as the Kirat 
leaders would like them to be…other facts of their lives and living 
such as economic interdependence, language, dress, ecology and 
destiny bind them together rather than separate them. “Retreating to 
an ideal and convenient past to construct the symbol of difference is 
common but in no way easy for the Kiratas” (Subba, 1999: 106).  
 
Nepamul ethnicity in Sikkim is nothing but a myth of 
collective ancestry. They had to suffer against the feudal oppression 
in the Buddhist kingdom of Sikkim ruled by Bhutia kings. They 
were exploited by the landed gentry, which was largely Buddhist. 
They had to pay a higher rate of land rent in cash compared to the 
older subjects of Sikkim, who paid it in kind. They were subjected 
to series of exploitative labour obligations in the forms of kurwa, 
bethi, jharlangi, and kalobhari. Against all such oppressions, they 
stood together as one community. They were known as fighters in 
the battlefield, but their fight against the unequal and unjust feudal 
system was almost unknown outside Sikkim. In a way, this fight 
came to an end in 1975, when the feudal dispensation came to an 
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end and they chose a series of identities available to them with a 
view to appropriating certain resources (Sinha, 1981).  
 
After 1975, Nepamul Sikkimese are engaged in a different 
kind of struggle, which is addressed to finding an honourable place 
in Indian political system. First, they fought for recognition of 
Nepali as an Indian language, citizenship rights to Nepamul 
Sikkimese and separate seats for them in the state legislative 
assembly. They succeeded in the first two and are trying to achieve 
the third one through the attainment of the constitutional status as 
Scheduled Tribes. 
 
Bibliography 
Akhil Bhujel Sangha (ABS). 2005. Ethnography of Bhujel Tribe. 
Ethnographic Report submitted to the Committee 
constituted by the Government of Sikkim.  
Akhil Kirat Dewan (Yakha) Sangha (AKDS). 2005. Ethnography of 
Dewans (Yakhas) of Sikkim. Ethnographic Report. 
Akhil Kirat Rai Sangh, Sikkim. 2004. Ethnographic Report. 
All Sikkim Gurung (Tamu) Buddhist Association. 2005. The 
Gurungs of Sikkim. Ethnographic Report.  
All Sikkim Mangar Association. 2005. Historical Background of 
Mangars of Sikkim. Ethnographic Report. 
Alley, S. 2003. Magar Jatiko Itihas Ani Sanskriti: Sikkimko 
Sandardhma (Nepali). Gangtok: Asal Thapa et al. 
Berger, Bennett M. 1995. An Essay on Culture: Symbolic Structure 
and Social Structure. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Basnet, L. B. 1973. Sikkim: A Political History. New Delhi: S 
Chand & Co. 
Caplan, L. 1995. Warrior Gentleman: “Gurkhas” in the Western 
Imagination. Oxford: Berghan Books. 
Dutta Ray, S. K. 1983. Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim. 
New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House. 
Edger, J. W. 1874/1969. Report on a Visit to Sikhim and Thibetan 
Frontier: In October, November, and December, 1873.  
New Delhi: Manjusri Publishing House. 
Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Volume 2, Numbers 1 & 2, 2006. 
 
 21
Gellner, D. 1997. Ethnicity and Nationalism in the World’s only 
Hindu State.  In D. Gellner, et.al. (eds), Nationalism and 
Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in 
Contemporary Nepal. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic 
Publishers. 
Gurung, Harka. 1997. State and Society in Nepal. In D. Gellner 
et.al. (eds), Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: 
The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal.  
Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.  
Hutt, M. 2003. Unbecoming Citizens: Culture, Nationhood, and the 
Flight of Refugees from Bhutan. New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press. 
Kazi, J. N. 1994. Against the Tide: Inside Sikkim. Gangtok: Hill 
Media Publication. 
Pradhan, B. 1999. Kirat Banshi Sunuwar (Mukhia) Koinch (Nepali). 
Gangtok: Sikkim Sunuwar (Mukhia) Koinchbu.  
Rai, S. K. 2005. Kirat Khambu Rais of Sikkim and Eastern 
Himalayas. Gangtok: Shivika Enterprise. 
Risley, H. H. 1894/1972. Gazetteer of Sikkim. New Delhi: 
Manjushri. 
Sikkim Sunuwar (Mukhia) Koinchbu. 2003. A Brief Report on the 
Ethnographic Account & Socio- Economic Status of the 
Sunuwar (Mukhia alias Koinch) of Sikkim. Ethnographic 
Report. 
Sinha, A. 1975: Politics of Sikkim. Faridabad: Thompson Press. 
Sinha, A. C. 1981. Resource Distribution and Multiple Ethnic 
Identity Sikkim. In Christoph von Furer-Haimendorf (ed), 
Asian Highland Societies in Anthropological Perspective. 
New Delhi: Sterling Publishing House. 
Sinha, A. C. 1998. Bhutan Ethnic Identity and National Dilemma.  
New Delhi: Reliance Publishing Co., 2
nd
 Edition. 
Sinha, A. C. and T. B. Subba. 2003. Nepalis in Northeast India: A 
Community in Search of Indian Identity. New Delhi: Indus 
Publishing Company. 
Subba, T. B. 1999. Politics of Culture: A Study of Three Kirata 
Communities in the Eastern Himalayas. Hyderabad: Orient 
Longman. 
Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Volume 2, Numbers 1 & 2, 2006. 
 
 22
White, J. C. 1971. Sikhim and Bhutan: Twenty-one Years on North-
East Frontier: 1887-1908. Delhi: Vivek Publishing House. 
 
_______________ 
 
Professor A. C. Sinha is former Dean, School of Social Sciences, North-Eastern 
Hill University, Shillong. He may be contacted at D/7331, Vasantkunj, New 
Delhi, 110 070. Email: acoomarsinha@yahoo.co.in 
 
 
 
  
  
  
